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This paper is concerned with the EU financing reform, where the lump-sum tax is considered as an alternative source of 
revenue. The purpose of this study stems out of the current debate related to the EU budget reform, where tax-based own-
resources are required to replace the current system of own resources of the EU budget. The novelty of this research 
arises from the evaluation of a hypothetical EU lump-sum tax as a future replacement of GNI and VAT-based EU budget 
own sources. The aim of this paper is to analyze the potential of a lump-sum tax as a source of future EU funding. We 
consider lump-sum tax as an EU per capita charge applicable to all citizens of 28 EU member states. In order to assess 
the lump-sum tax potential we simulate five different lump-sum tax rates and compare the obtained yield to current EU 
own resources. The results of the research show that a charge per capita in the EU does not have the capacity to fully 
replace GNI or VAT-based EU own resources. Therefore, we consider the EU per capita charge as a form of 
complementary source to fund the EU own budget, with no real potential to fully replace the current EU own resources.  
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Introduction   
 
Currently, the European Union is facing an intense 
debate on a necessary reform of the EU budget revenues, 
especially on a different set of resources, which should 
replace the present system of the EU budget own resources. 
There can be found number of arguments for support of the 
reform of the EU budget in discussions. The current design 
of the EU budget revenues lacks transparency, is prone to 
complicate adjustments and has low autonomy due to its 
dependence on GNI and VAT-based resources, as 
underlined by Sapir (2003), Le Cacheux (2005), Cipriani 
(2007) Fuest, Heinemann & Ungerer (2015) and 
Schratzenstaller et al. (2016). Moreover, Richter (2006) and 
Cipriani (2007) express the concern that the current system 
of financing the EU budget does not support the European 
added value and does not enhance the economies of scale at 
the EU level. Our research was conducted on the 
background of the most critique argument of current status 
quo, that there is no real connection between the present 
composition of the EU budget revenues and the Europe2020 
strategy of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
established by the European Commission in 2010. 
In the search for new own resources, the standard 
literature proposes several candidates  for the future EU 
taxes, such as Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), European 
Union Income Tax, EU VAT tax. There can also be found 
innovative candidates as the EU energy tax and also the EU 
carbon-based flight ticket tax or Common (Consolidated) 
Corporate Tax Base. It is necessary to mention, that the 
lump-sum taxation has not been considered by the existent 
literature as a possible candidate for the future EU tax yet. 
The scientific problem this paper is focusing on the 
possible reform of revenue side of the EU budget and the 
possibility of enacting the future EU lump-sum tax as an 
appropriate replacement of the current system of the EU 
budget own resources. The aim of the paper is not only to 
estimate the revenue potential of the lump-sum tax with 
respect to the EU budget, but also to evaluate whether it 
could be a useful instrument for closing in the sustainability 
gaps of current tax systems across the EU as defined by 
Schratzenstaller et al. (2016).  
The methodology used in this research is qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. In the first part of this paper we review 
the literature regarding the issues of the EU budget and also 
the experiences related with the lump-sum taxation 
enactment. In the second part of this paper we use 
qualitative analysis to assess the ability of the lump-sum tax 
to close the sustainability gaps of tax system in the form of 
the future EU tax. Also we evaluate empirically the revenue 
potential of the lump-sum tax at the EU level and compare 
its potential of per capita tax imposed yearly with the current 
system of the EU budget sources of revenues. This paper 
presents the results of the research within the cross-
disciplinary H2020 EU project FairTax No. 649439, 
“Revisioning the ´Fiscal EU´: Fair, Sustainable, and 
Coordinated Tax and Social Policies”. 
 
The Need for the Reform 
 
The EU budget finances are regulated by Articles 310 
and 311 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. According to this treaty, the EU is not allowed to 
run budget deficits and financing through public debt is 
excluded. The structure of the EU budget own resources 
has evolved through time, where a dominant trend of 
permanent increase of GNI-based resources share in total 
EU own resources is present. The current system of the EU 
own revenues is financed predominantly by own resources, 
which amount up to 94 % of total revenues. The rest of 6 
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% is financed through other revenues collected from taxes 
paid by the EU staff salaries, fines and contributions from 
the non-EU states. The GNI-based resource bears the 
highest percentage in own resources (68.9 % in 2015), the 
second place is occupied by Traditional Own Resources 
(TOR) which amount up to 12.8 % in 2015 and VAT-
based resources (12.3 % in 2015). 
The GNI and VAT-based resources in total revenues of 
the EU budget represent direct contribution from national 
budgets of each EU member state. Cipriani (2007) points 
out that these contributions raise the national awareness of 
the cost of the EU budget, and creates the ongoing debate 
between net payers and net recipients, especially regarding 
the benefits generated by the EU expenditures which are 
less visible at the national level. 
Taking into account the current structure of the EU 
budget own resources, the literature reveals important 
weaknesses and disadvantages of the EU revenues, 
requiring a reform of own resources. Sapir (2003) 
considers that the current system of the EU own resources 
is a historical relic. The author underlines that all the 
procedures related to the EU revenues and expenditures do 
not reflect the present and future process of the EU 
integration. On the same rationale, Cipriani (2007) 
considers the current system of the EU budget resources to 
be opaque, complex and also outdated. Another weakness 
of the EU budget system of own resources consist into lack 
of connection between funding and spending on economic 
public goods that would increase the economies of scale at 
the EU level (Benedetto, 2013). Sapir (2003), Le Cacheux 
(2005, 2007), Cipriani (2007), Heinemann, Mohl & 
Osterloh (2010), Neheider & Santos (2011)  and 
Schratzenstaller et al. (2016) argue that high dependence of 
the EU budget on GNI and VAT-based contributions from 
national budgets increases the juste retour rhetoric and 
insistent focus of the EU member state to improve the net 
balance position. Núñez-Ferrer (2007) and Schratzenstaller 
et al. (2016) consider that budgetary debates and lack of 
unanimity in terms of the EU budget revenues and 
spending leads to complicate adjustments, lack of 
transparency and low autonomy. Begg & Heinemann 
(2006), underline that the current design of the EU 
finances raise issues regarding economic rationale, 
effectiveness and financial burden sharing among the EU 
member states. Neheider & Santos (2011) and Cottarelli 
(2016) consider that EU budget effectiveness is affected by 
its size, which small in comparison with the EU GNI 
(1.23% in 2015). With respect to its small size, the EU 
budget has low effectiveness compared with objectives 
intended to be reached and current policies pursued. 
Sapir (2003), Tabellini (2003) and Cipriani (2007) 
point that there is no clear connection between the EU 
budget own resources and European added value. The 
concept of European added value is defined by Cipriani 
(2007) as the raison d'être of the EU budget. The author 
underlines that through the EU budget revenues and 
expenditure, the objectives can be achieved with better 
results and more efficiently than by each member state 
individually.  
Another source of criticism regarding the efficiency of 
the current system of the EU budget own resources is the 
lack of connection with Europe2020 strategy. The 
European Commission (2010) established a strategy of 
internalizing the structural weaknesses of the EU’s 
economy. Thus, the Europe2020 strategy devised a 
transformation towards smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, which would deliver higher levels of employment, 
productivity and social cohesion. According to the 
European Commission (2010) there are three mutually 
reinforcing priorities established by Europe2020 strategy: 
smart growth or developing an economy based on 
knowledge and innovation; sustainable growth or 
promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more 
competitive economy; and inclusive growth or enhancing 
high-employment economy  or improving social and 
territorial cohesion. In this context, the EU budget and the 
policies financed at the EU level should follow the path 
underlined by Europe2020 strategy. 
When considering the role of the EU budget in 
achieving the Europe2020 objectives, looking particularly 
at the revenue side, the aforementioned priorities can be 
easily transposed into the three pillars of sustainable 
development. Hence, the EU budget revenues should 
support economic, social and environmental sustainability 
as underlined firstly by Stiglitz, Fitoussi & Sen (2010) and 
later by Schratzenstaller (2013), Nerudova et al. (2016) and 
Schratzenstaller et al. (2016). Taking into consideration the 
aforementioned papers, the literature require a reform of the 
EU budget own resources, proposing a switch from the 
current own resources to the future EU taxes that would 
replace GNI, VAT-based resources and TOR (Le Cacheux, 
2005; Cipriani, 2007; Fenge & Wrede (2007); Heinemann, 
Mohl & Osterloch, 2008a; Heinemann, Mohl & Osterloch, 
2009; Schratzenstaller, 2013; Iara, 2015; Schratzenstaller et 
al., 2016). 
In this context, where the future EU taxes represent 
appropriate instruments to replace the current system of the 
EU budget own resources, Cipriani (2007) proposes a set 
of criteria that the new own resources should fulfill: the 
system of revenues should be applicable to all the EU 
member states in the same manner; the system of revenues 
should be built-to-last and would not be subject to changes 
every financial framework; and also this system of 
revenues should be equitable, transparent, cost-effective 
and simple. In the same line Schratzenstaller (2013) 
considers that beside the traditional evaluation criteria, the 
future EU own taxes should be sustainability oriented 
achieving conditions such as: degree of regional 
attribution, mobility of tax base, short-term volatility and 
long-term yield, visibility and equality of gross-burden-
sharing at the national level. Furthermore, Schratzenstaller 
et al. (2016) argue that the future EU own tax should close 
in also the sustainability gaps of current tax systems across 
the EU, such as: increasing weight on labor taxes; 
decreasing progressivity of tax systems and increasing of 
income inequality; decreasing importance of Pigovian 
taxation that could internalize the cross-border negative 
externalities; intense tax competition; and decreasing tax 
compliance and issues with tax fraud. 
 
Experiences with Lump-Sum Tax in the EU 
 
The first trace of lump-sum taxation in the literature 
dates back to Adam Smith works (1776). Graaf (1987) 
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considers that the lump-sum taxation as one of the 
simplest, most efficient and costless fiscal instrument. This 
opinion can even be found later in studies by Rothbard 
(1995) and Myles & Hindricks (2004). The lump-sum tax in 
the literature is usually used as the ideal tool and also as a 
benchmark employed to compare the efficiency of second-
best tax instruments. The authors underline that lump-sum 
taxation is difficult to avoid, has no excess burden and does 
not create a substitution effect. Even if lump-sum taxation is 
considered highly efficient, Hillman (2003), Tam (2004) and 
Gans et al. (2011) argue that the disadvantages of lump-sum 
taxation arise from its disregard of ability-to-pay principle. 
The authors stress that the inseparability between efficiency 
and equity criteria lead to inapplicability of the lump-sum 
taxation in the real world. Gans et al. (2011) consider lump-
sum taxation to be unfair, unethical and politically difficult 
to enact.   
The lump-sum tax in the form of community charge was 
imposed in the UK aiming to replace a tax on property. The 
lump-sum tax was flat tax rate imposed on all individuals 
except few special groups of recipients (i.e. disable persons).  
The aversion against the UK lump-sum in the society tax 
was mainly caused by its high average rate, which affected 
low-income households.   This poll tax was deemed as 
unfair, highly unpopular and regressive. Along the social 
unrest and unfairness the lump-sum tax abolition was 
triggered by the tax noncompliance. The individual’s 
mobility proved to be the main cause of high administration 
costs related with lump-sum tax revenues collection. In 
some cases, the government spent more money in tracking 
the taxpayers (i.e. on tax administration) than the tax could 
bring to the public budget. Besley, Preston and Ridge (1997) 
analyze the noncompliance of lump-sum tax in the UK. The 
authors found that the UK’s community charge 
noncompliance arose primarily from the high tax burden. On 
the other hand, tax noncompliance was also favored by 
avoiding registration in official documents of the 
individuals, which made tax administrative costs exceeding 
the tax revenues from the lump-sum tax. Myles and 
Hindricks (2004) examine the applicability and viability of 
the lump-sum tax, enacted in United Kingdom between 
1986-1990, named formally “the Community charge” or the 
informal poll tax. The authors argue that the UK taxpayers 
could avoid the poll tax by ensuring that their name does not 
appear in any official registers. In the same line,  
Rothbard (1995) considers that the community charge 
imposed during the Margaret Thatcher rule in the UK, was a 
bold and fascinating experiment for the public finance 
theory. The equal poll tax imposed for each UK’s adult 
resulted in anti-tax riots across the entire country. The author 
notes that the government spent substantial resources in 
“hunting” the taxpayers that avoided the community charge 
payment. Another flaw of the UK lump-sum tax experience 
came from the fact that the tax did not have a lower limit. 
The size of the tax rate was left at the local councils to 
decide, which resulted in dramatic tax rate increase, where 
some households were supposed to pay a tax by 30 % higher 
than before community charge enactment.  
Against all the criticisms, the lump-sum tax regime can 
be found implemented in Luxembourg and Switzerland. 
According to Sansonetti, Hostettler, & Funfschilling (2011) 
the lump-sum tax was introduced in Switzerland in order to 
enhance tourism and economic benefits of Swiss state. The 
lump-sum tax has been adopted in all Cantons of 
Switzerland since 1948. However, this tax was present in 
Canton of Vaud and Canton of Geneva since 1862. 
Currently, the lump-sum tax is imposed under specific 
criteria, under which 5450 individuals are liable to pay 
lump-sum tax. In order to be eligible to lump-sum taxation 
in Switzerland, the individuals should not hold the Swiss 
citizenship and should not be engaged in any gainful activity 
on Swiss soil, but choose to live in Switzerland. The tax 
base for lump-sum taxation is calculated using the living 
expenditures, such as housing, food and clothing, education, 
sport and travel costs. Sansonetti, Hostettler & Funfshilling 
(2011) argue that this type of tax regime is highly beneficial 
for wealthy and mobile individuals. 
 
The EU Lump-Sum Tax as an Option and 
Evaluation Methodology 
 
In order to research the ability of lump-sum taxation to 
become a potential candidate to replace GNI and VAT-
based EU own resources, we use both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. Firstly, we measure the suitability of 
lump-sum tax using the traditional evaluation criteria of 
taxation proposed by European Commission (2004) and 
Heinemann, Mohl & Osterloh (2008b). Moreover, we 
assess the capacity of the EU future lump-sum taxation to 
close-in the tax system sustainability gaps underlined by 
Schratzenstaller et al. (2016). 
Secondly, we employ an empirical analysis of the 
future EU lump-sum tax revenue potential, by simulating 
five different tax rates imposed on all the EU citizens and 
also citizens aged between 15–64 years from the EU 
member states. Furthermore, with the obtained results from 
the simulations, we compare the ability of the EU lump-
sum tax to replace the current system of the EU budget 
own resources.  
The proposed the EU own resource reform which 
would require a switch from the current system of revenues 
to the future EU own taxes, represents a lengthy and 
laborious process. At first glance, this switch would have 
to overtake many obstacles from fiscal and political 
dimension. The critics of such reform might point the 
political barriers to be overcome in order to impose a 
stable and sufficient set of the future EU taxes, taking into 
consideration that a system of the EU own resources is 
already established. However, taxes do not represents just 
tools to collect revenues at the EU Budget, but taxes have 
an in-built fiscal leverage effect, which are more efficient 
than GNI-based resources to stimulate smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth and also higher ability to close in the 
sustainability gaps.  
The motivation concerning the enactment of the future 
EU lump-sum tax, by imposing flat tax rate for the each EU 
citizen, is due to the fact that all of them enjoy and benefit 
from the EU socio-economic framework. Therefore, this tax 
treats equals equally – regardless of income, wealth, 
endowment and preferences – the EU citizens are 
considered to be equal in front of the law, human and 
property rights protection, free and equal access to the 
opportunities to self-developing both personally and 
professionally in the EU. Consequently, the objective of 
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the EU lump-sum tax should refer exclusively to the 
benefits of individuals to be part of the European Union, 
such as: free movement of goods, services, labor and 
capital. Also, the EU citizens enjoy in this framework 
higher opportunities for personal and professional 
development. Thus, following the Ramsey principle of 
optimal taxation, the lump-sum tax base is represented by 
the observable characteristics of individuals to be citizens 
of an EU member state. Hence, the tax should be imposed 
solely on this condition, regardless of any other 
observables of the individuals (i.e. taste, ability, race, sex, 
income or wealth). The horizontal equity, in case of the 
uniform EU lump-sum tax treats equals equally, by 
considering the quality of being the EU citizen which 
benefit from this socio-economic framework, where they 
can travel, work, live and develop freely. 
There can be done an extrapolation between Ramsey’s 
optimal commodity taxation and the optimal lump-sum 
tax. Ramsey (1927) introduced the inverse elasticity rule of 
commodity taxation.  An optimal commodity tax should 
have a broad tax base, affecting the production and 
consumption of goods on the large scale. Thus, the 
substitution effect would not appear and the tax will not 
affect greatly the consumption and production pattern. The 
behavior adjustment of the individual, taken as 
representative consumer or/and worker, seeks to pay less 
consumption and income tax. This behavior reaction 
creates the deadweight loss or the net economic loss with 
respect of resources allocation in the economy compared 
with no-tax world. Elkins (2006) argues that one way to 
reduce the efficiency loses is to impose a equal lump-sum 
tax on all individuals, which would create the same tax 
burden on every individual regardless of his behavior 
towards work and consumption. The author considers that 
the viability of the tax stays in the principle – the higher 
the elasticity the lower the tax rate, where the narrower the 
tax base the higher will be the elasticity. In this case the 
taxpayer can adjust his behavior in order to avoid paying 
taxes. In the opposite case when the tax base is broad the 
elasticity is low, and the taxpayer has little room to avoid 
the tax. Thus from this point of view the lump-sum tax 
base imposed on the EU citizens, has a broad tax base and 
there are few highly unlikely escape routes for avoiding the 
tax – migration or death. 
In case of lump-sum tax, there is a debate regarding its 
connection to vertical and horizontal equity. Assuming that 
a uniform, flat tax rate imposed on the each EU citizen 
treats equals equally, the lump-sum tax respects the 
horizontal equity criteria.  Having in mind previous 
features of lump-sum taxation, any differentiation and thus 
substitution effect triggering, the tax loses its lump-sum 
characteristics. 
We choose also the evaluate the future EU lump-sum 
applicability, by taking into consideration the traditional 
evaluation criteria established by European Commission 
(2004) and also its ability to close in the sustainability gaps 
assessed by Schratzenstaller et al. (2016). In Table no.1 we 
firstly evaluate the lump-sum against the traditional 
evaluation criteria. The lump-sum taxation, as mentioned 
in previous section, is one of the simplest, transparent and 
cost-efficient tax instruments. Also, this tax has a high 
potential with respect to long-term yield. Lump-sum tax is 
not affected by mobility of tax base, due to the fact that the 
tax liability is exclusively related to the quality of the 
taxpayer to be the EU citizen. However, imposing lump-
sum as flat tax per year for each citizen, the resulting 
degree of regional attribution is obvious. Also the lump-
sum tax does not establish any links between tax base (the 
EU citizenship) and the national income. One of the most 
important evaluation criteria that the lump-sum tax is 
overlooking is the equity or the ability-to-pay of the 
taxpayers. Because lump-sum taxation is perceived to be 
highly inequitable, this feature plays a crucial role in 




Evaluation of Lump-Sum Taxation as the Potential EU Tax 
 
*Source: Adaptation after the evaluation criteria proposed by the European Commission (2004), Cipriani (2007), Schratzenstaller (2013) and 










Traditional Evaluation Criteria 
Equitable No 
Transparent Yes  
Cost-effective Yes  
Simple Yes  
Degree of regional attribution Yes  
Mobility of tax base No  
Short-term volatility No  
Long-term yield Yes  
Equality of gross-burden-sharing at the national level No  
Potential to close in the tax system sustainability gaps 
Decrease the weight on labor taxes Yes  
Increase the tax system progressivity No  
Decrease the income inequality No  
Cross-border negative externalities internalization No  
Decrease tax competition No  
Increase the tax compliance Yes  
Decrease of tax fraud Yes  
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In Table no.1 we use a Yes/No method to evaluate the 
ability of the lump-sum taxation to fulfill the selected 
evaluation criteria. In the second part of Table no. 1, we 
analyzed the ability of lump-sum taxation to close in the 
sustainability gaps pointed by Schratzenstaller et al. 
(2016). With respect to the capacity of the future EU lump-
sum to decrease the weight on labor taxes, we consider that 
the switch to this levy could provide a relief of current tax 
system on labor taxes. In case of increasing the tax system 
progressivity gap, the lump-sum plays a minor role, where 
other tax instruments could close in this gap more 
efficiently. When referring to the ability of lump-sum tax to 
contribute to decrease of income inequality, the lump-sum 
tax has no role, due to the fact that this tax is by default 
ignoring the ability-to-pay of the taxpayer. Also, future 
lump-sum tax has no stimulus effect with respect to the 
internalization of cross-border negative externalities, such as 
pollution or to decrease the company tax competition. 
With respect to the last two sustainability gaps 
presented in Table no.1, we consider that the future EU 
lump-sum could perform efficiently in decreasing the tax 
fraud and increasing tax compliance. Due to its simplicity 
and transparency, avoiding lump-sum tax is only possible 
through emigration or the taxpayer should cease to exist. 
In examining the potential of revenues that a lump-sum 
tax could collect to the EU budget, we use the data 
regarding the population size of EU 28 countries. The data 
employed is for the year 2014, where the European Union 
had a population of 506.94 million. Thus, as shown in the 
Table no. 2, we explore the potential of lump-sum tax in 
the EU, applied as yearly uniform flat tax rate per person. 
We use five different tax rates in order to assess the 
potential tax revenues that the head tax could produce. 
The calculation is started with a lower level of EUR 1 
charge per person paid each year. The second level 
increases the tax rate to EUR 3.65, assuming that every EU 
citizen is liable to pay EUR Cent 1 per day. The last 3 tax 
rates take into account EUR 5, EUR 10 and EUR 100 per 
person which should be paid annually. 
 
Table 2 
The EU Lump-Sum Tax Revenues Potential Estimation Using 2014 Level of Population 
 
 
Population Ls (1 EUR) Ls (1 EUR Cent/day) Ls (5 EUR) Ls (10 EUR) Ls (100 EUR) 
Million EUR Mil. EUR Mil.  EUR Mil.  EUR Mil.  EUR Mil.  
EU (28 countries) 506.94 506.94 1850.35 2534.72 5069.44 50694.41 
Belgium 11.20 11.20 40.89 56.02 112.04 1120.40 
Bulgaria 7.25 7.25 26.45 36.23 72.46 724.57 
Czech Republic 10.51 10.51 38.37 52.56 105.12 1051.24 
Denmark 5.63 5.63 20.54 28.14 56.27 562.72 
Germany 80.77 80.77 294.80 403.84 807.67 8076.75 
Estonia 1.32 1.32 4.80 6.58 13.16 131.58 
Ireland 4.61 4.61 16.81 23.03 46.06 460.55 
Greece 10.93 10.93 39.88 54.63 109.27 1092.68 
Spain 46.51 46.51 169.77 232.56 465.12 4651.22 
France 65.89 65.89 240.50 329.45 658.89 6588.91 
Croatia 4.25 4.25 15.50 21.23 42.47 424.68 
Italy 60.78 60.78 221.86 303.91 607.83 6078.27 
Cyprus 0.86 0.86 3.13 4.29 8.58 85.80 
Latvia 2.00 2.00 7.31 10.01 20.01 200.15 
Lithuania 2.94 2.94 10.74 14.72 29.43 294.35 
Luxembourg 0.55 0.55 2.01 2.75 5.50 54.97 
Hungary 9.88 9.88 36.05 49.39 98.77 987.74 
Malta 0.43 0.43 1.55 2.13 4.25 42.54 
Netherlands 16.83 16.83 61.43 84.15 168.29 1682.93 
Austria 8.51 8.51 31.05 42.53 85.07 850.69 
Poland 38.02 38.02 138.77 190.09 380.18 3801.79 
Portugal 10.43 10.43 38.06 52.14 104.27 1042.73 
Romania 19.95 19.95 72.81 99.74 199.47 1994.73 
Slovenia 2.06 2.06 7.52 10.31 20.61 206.11 
Slovakia 5.42 5.42 19.77 27.08 54.16 541.59 
Finland 5.45 5.45 19.90 27.26 54.51 545.13 
Sweden 9.64 9.64 35.20 48.22 96.45 964.49 
United Kingdom 64.35 64.35 234.88 321.76 643.51 6435.12 
*Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data; Ls = simulated the EU lump-sum tax rate. 
 
In table no. 2 we simulate five different lump-sum tax 
rates applied at the EU level. The application of first two 
tax rates, conceived as the lowest level, would raise to the 
EU budget more than EUR 500 mil., an amount which 
would seem as very low compared with the current EU 
own resources.  The EUR Cent 1 per day, paid by every 
EU citizen would collect at the end of the year close to 
EUR 1.8 bn. The 5 EUR lump-sum tax rate would bring 
EUR 2.5 Bn. and the EUR 10 tax rate would bring EUR 
5.06 bn. to the EU budget. The last tax rate employed, 
EUR 100 per person paid annually, would bring to the EU 
budget more than EUR 50 Bn., which is a substantial 
source of revenues. However, this higher limit of lump-
sum tax is significantly regressive, imposing an unbearable 
burden on the low and middle income households.  
As shown in the table no. 2, the tax revenues are copying 
the differences in population across the EU member states, 
such as Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Poland in 
comparison with the rest of the 28 EU countries. Thus, there 
is a default differentiation between the EU countries and 
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their contribution to the EU budget through the lump-sum 
tax. Germany would be the country which contributes the 
most due to the high population level and Malta would 
generate the lowest volume of the tax revenues. 
The below stated Table no. 3 presents the revenue 
potential of lump-sum tax in relation to overall 
contribution of the EU member states to the EU budget. 
 
Table 3 










Ls (1 EUR 
Cent/day) 





EUR Bn.   
0.51 1.85 2.53 5.07 50.69 
EUR % % % % % 
VAT-based own resource 17.67 34.85 2.87 10.47 14.35 28.69 286.94 
GNI-based own resource 99.08 195.44 0.51 1.87 2.56 5.12 51.17 
Traditional own resources (TOR) 
(75%) 
16.43 32.41 3.09 11.26 15.43 30.86 308.56 
Customs duties (100%) 22.00 43.39 2.30 8.41 11.52 23.04 230.45 
Amounts (25%) retained as TOR 
collection costs (-) 
5.54 10.93 9.15 33.38 45.73 91.45 914.52 
Other revenue 9.97 19.67 5.08 18.55 25.41 50.83 508.30 
Gross National Income (GNI) 139.22 274.62 0.36 1.33 1.82 3.64 36.41 
TOTAL own resources 132.96 262.28 0.38 1.39 1.91 3.81 38.13 
TOTAL national contribution 116.53 229.87 0.44 1.59 2.18 4.35 43.50 
TOTAL REVENUE 143.94 283.94 0.35 1.29 1.76 3.52 35.22 
TOTAL EU EXPENDITURE 128.56 253.61 0.39 1.44 1.97 3.94 39.43 
TOTAL  Expenditure 142.50 281.09 0.36 1.30 1.78 3.56 35.58 
Surplus from previous year 1.01 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
*Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data; Ls = simulated EU lump-sum tax rate. 
 
In Table no. 3 we compare the obtained results after 
simulation with the EU budget own resources.  The second 
column shows the size of the EU lump-sum tax applied as 
charge per person in order to fully replace each component 
of the current EU own resources. As shown in Table no. 3, 
in order to replace the VAT-based resources, every EU 
citizen would have to pay EUR 34.85 person/year. On the 
other hand, to completely replace the GNI-based resources, 
the EU citizens would have to pay EUR 195.44 
person/year. Finally, a lump-sum tax of EUR 283.94 
person/year paid annually should be imposed to replace the 
entire system of EU own resources. This uniform tax rate 
applied yearly for the every EU citizen is highly regressive 
when low and middle income households are taken into 
account. For a couple with more than 3 dependent children, 
the total lump-sum tax would exceed EUR 1700 per year.  
Also in Table no. 3 we compared the obtained results 
for each lump-sum tax rate (i.e. EUR 1 person/year; EUR 
3.65 person/year; EUR 5 person/year; EUR 10 person/year 
and EUR 100 person/year) with the EU own resources and 
expenditures incurred for 2014, expressed in percentage. 
The first tax rate would only cover 0.39 % of the total EU 
budget revenues. The next two tax rates of the proposed 
lump-sum tax would cover between 1.3 and 1.8 % of total 
revenues collected in 2014. The EUR 10 person/year lump-
sum tax would cover less than 4 % of total revenues, and 
the highest lump-sum tax rate of EUR 100 person/year 
would cover only 40 % of total revenues collected to the 
EU budget.  Therefore, the EU lump-sum tax ability to 
collect revenues to the EU budget is strictly limited to the 
size of the tax, which is crucial for the applicability and the 
acceptance of this tax in the EU. 
Table 4 
The EU Lump-Sum Tax Revenues Potential Estimation Using 2014 Level of Population Aged between 15 – 64 Years Old and 
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0.33 1.22 1.67 3.35 33.46 
% % % % % 
VAT-based own resource 17.67 52.80 1.89 6.91 9.47 18.94 189.38 
GNI-based own resource 99.08 296.12 0.34 1.23 1.69 3.38 33.77 
Traditional own resources (TOR) 
(75%) 
16.43 49.10 2.04 7.43 10.18 20.36 203.65 
Customs duties (100%) 22.00 65.75 1.52 5.55 7.60 15.21 152.10 
Amounts (25%) retained as TOR 
collection costs (-) 
5.54 16.57 6.04 22.03 30.18 60.36 603.58 
Other revenue 9.97 29.81 3.35 12.24 16.77 33.55 335.48 
Gross National Income (GNI) 139.22 416.09 0.24 0.88 1.20 2.40 24.03 
TOTAL own resources 132.96 397.39 0.25 0.92 1.26 2.52 25.16 
TOTAL national contribution 116.53 348.29 0.29 1.05 1.44 2.87 28.71 
TOTAL REVENUE 143.94 430.21 0.23 0.85 1.16 2.32 23.24 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 128.56 384.25 0.26 0.95 1.30 2.60 26.02 
TOTAL EU  Expenditure 142.50 425.89 0.23 0.86 1.17 2.35 23.48 
*Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data; Ls = simulated EU lump-sum tax rate. 
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As shown in Table no. 4 we simulate the ability of the 
future EU-lump-sum tax to replace the current EU own  
resources by applying the tax only to the EU citizens aged 
between 15–64 years old. The dependent categories of 
population aged between 0-14 years and 65+ years were 
excluded from the simulation. The second column of Table 
no. 4 shows the required the EU lump-sum tax rate to fully 
replace the current system of EU own resources. According 
to Eurostat, the population deemed to be active 
economically amounts to 66 % of the total EU population 
in 2014. Therefore, as shown in Table no. 4, every EU 
citizen that is aged between 15–64 years should pay a 
yearly lump-sum tax of EUR 52.80 in order to fully replace 
the VAT-based EU resources in 2014. In order to fully 
replace the GNI-based resources, every citizen of the EU 
that is economically active should pay a lump-sum tax rate 
of EUR 296.12 person/year. In a scenario where lump-sum 
tax or a per capita charge would be imposed to fully 
replace the current system of the EU budget revenues, 
every EU citizen aged between 15–64 years should pay 
EUR 430.31 person/year. With respect to our five tax rates 
proposed for a lump-sum tax at the EU level, the revenue 
potential of this tax is presented in Table no. 6. The first 
three tax rates of EUR 1 person/year, EUR 3.65 person/year 
and EUR 5 person/year paid by the economically active EU 
citizens would produce EUR 0.33 bn., EUR 1.22 bn. and 
EUR 1.67 bn. The last two tax rates of EUR 10 person/year 
and EUR 100 person/year would produce EUR 3.35 bn. 
and respectively EUR 33.46 bn. 
Also in Table no. 4 we compared the revenue potential 
of each lump-sum tax rate with the EU budget resources in 
2014. The first two tax rates would cover less than 1 % of 
total EU budget revenues. The next two tax rates would 
cover only a modest 1–2 % of the total EU budget 
revenues. The last lump-sum tax rate proposed by us, of 
EUR 100 person/year would only cover 23.24 % of the 
total EU revenues. 
The above stated table shows that narrowing the tax 
base of lump-sum taxation, partly for equity consideration 
by targeting only the economically active citizens of EU, 
the revenue potential of the EU per capita charge is 
significantly lower. Even if lump-sum taxation is 
considered as one of the most efficient, simple and easy to 
collect, in order to fully replace all the EU budget current 
sources, a tax rate of EUR 430.21 person/year would be 




Shifts in total National Contribution of Each EU Member to the EU Budget in Case of Lump-Sum Tax Enactment to Fully 




with age between 
15-64 years 
Percentage of each EU 
member state to total EU 
population  aged between 15-
64 years 
Contribution of each EU 
member state to EU budget 
using current system of EU 
sources (GNI, VAT and TOR) 
in 2014 
Lump-sum tax contribution 
to EU budget (full 
replacement of current EU 
own sources) 
Mil. % EUR Bn. EUR Bn. 
EU (28 countries) 334.58 - 132.96 132.96 
Belgium 7.39 2.21 5.23 2.94 
Bulgaria 4.78 1.43 0.46 1.90 
Czech Republic 6.94 2.07 1.51 2.76 
Denmark 3.71 1.11 2.51 1.48 
Germany 53.31 15.93 29.14 21.18 
Estonia 0.87 0.26 0.20 0.35 
Ireland 3.04 0.91 1.65 1.21 
Greece 7.21 2.16 1.95 2.87 
Spain 30.70 9.18 11.11 12.20 
France 43.49 13.00 20.97 17.28 
Croatia 2.80 0.84 0.43 1.11 
Italy 40.12 11.99 15.89 15.94 
Cyprus 0.57 0.17 0.16 0.23 
Latvia 1.32 0.39 0.27 0.52 
Lithuania 1.94 0.58 0.38 0.77 
Luxembourg 0.36 0.11 0.25 0.14 
Hungary 6.52 1.95 1.00 2.59 
Malta 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.11 
Netherlands 11.11 3.32 8.37 4.41 
Austria 5.61 1.68 2.87 2.23 
Poland 25.09 7.50 3.95 9.97 
Portugal 6.88 2.06 1.75 2.73 
Romania 13.17 3.93 1.46 5.23 
Slovenia 1.36 0.41 0.39 0.54 
Slovakia 3.57 1.07 0.72 1.42 
Finland 3.60 1.08 1.90 1.43 
Sweden 6.37 1.90 4.29 2.53 
United Kingdom 42.47 12.69 14.07 16.88 
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The table no. 5 shows how the financial burden would 
shift between the EU member states, in the hypothetical 
case of lump-sum tax enactment to finance the EU budget. 
Therefore, we choose to compare total national 
contribution of each member state to the EU budget in 
2014, using current system of sources (VAT-based sources, 
GNI-based sources and TOR- Traditional Own Resources) 
with the case of lump-sum tax. Table no. 5 presents 
considerable shifts of financial burden, when the 
contribution of the each EU member state to the EU budget 
is based on lump-sum tax and using population as tax base. 
In this scenario, it is important to underline that the five out 
of six founding states of the EU, namely Belgium, 
Germany, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands would 
decrease their contribution to the EU budget. Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands would pay approximatively 
50 % less than under current system of the EU budget 
resources. Italy would be the only country which would not 
incur significant modifications in her contribution to the 
EU budget in a scenario of lump-sum tax enactment. 
Using population as the exclusive criteria to calculate 
each EU member state contribution to the EU budget, we 
observe notable shifts of financial burden especially to new 
members of the EU. The EU member states such as 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia 
and Slovakia would need to incur substantial increases of 
their contribution to the EU budget. 
Based on the results of simulations presented in Table 
no. 5, we can conclude that lump-sum tax is not only 
inequitable by treating all individuals equally, but is also 
inequitable when is treating equally a group of 
heterogeneous countries, such as the EU member states. 
Charging a per capita tax at the EU level in order to finance 
the EU budget would impose an unbearable financial stress 
on the net recipients under the current EU Budget, in 
comparison with the current net contributors. Even if lump-
sum taxation is deemed to be the most efficient tax, this 
levy is ignoring the equity principle or the ability to pay at 




The scientific problem this paper is focusing on 
represents the possible reform of revenue side of the EU 
budget and the possibility of enacting the future EU lump-
sum tax as an appropriate replacement of current system of 
the EU budget own resources. Therefore, the aim of the 
paper is to evaluate, whether lump-sum tax could be 
considered as the potential EU tax, referring to its in-built 
features to close in the sustainability gaps of current tax 
systems across the EU as defined by Schratzenstaller et al. 
(2016).  
It is important to mention that this type of taxation has 
not been discussed as a potential candidate on the EU own 
resource yet. Moreover, there are no studies which research 
the potential of lump-sum tax to replace the current system 
of the EU own resources. The lump-sum tax is used as the 
ideal, first-best tool, to compare the efficiency and equity 
level of second-best tax instruments. With respect to the 
viability of lump-sum taxes there is an ongoing conflict 
between fundamental principles (i.e. evaluation criteria) 
that underlie the lump-sum tax – efficiency and equity. By 
definition, the lump-sum is one of the most efficient tax 
tools that the government can make use. It is a tax that does 
not create deadweight loss and has a low administration 
costs.  
However, even if the tax is respecting the efficiency 
criteria it is overlooking the equity criteria. The lump-sum 
tax does not consider the ability-to-pay principle, thus 
becoming solely a theoretical tool. The past experiences 
with lump-sum taxes have shown that this tax is highly 
unpopular, regressive, unfair towards low-income 
taxpayers and politically difficult to implement. In order to 
qualify as a potential candidate to finance EU budget, the 
lump-sum tax needs to be assessed in the particular 
framework of the EU. One peculiar evaluation of lump-
sum tax is related with its ability to enhance Europe2020 
strategy of “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”. A 
future EU lump-sum tax could contribute to Europe2020 
strategy by decreasing the weight of the EU tax systems on 
labor taxation, thus enhancing employment, increasing tax 
compliance and reducing tax evasion. However, the future 
EU lump-sum tax has no ability to reduce climate change, 
poverty and social exclusion or to increase energy 
efficiency and research and development at the EU level. 
A sustainable tax system is defined by Nerudova et al. 
(2016) as the tax system which contributes to economic, 
social, environmental and institutional sustainability. It is a 
tax system that allows meeting the needs of present 
generation without limiting the future generations to meet 
their own needs. Therefore we evaluate the ability of a 
hypothetical the future EU lump-sum tax to close-in the tax 
system sustainability gaps which affect the four pillars of 
sustainability – economic, social, environmental and 
institutional pillar. 
Consequently, lump-sum taxation should be evaluated 
taking into consideration the current challenges of tax 
systems across the EU and the capacity of the lump-sum 
taxation to close the tax sustainability gaps. Hence the 
lump-sum tax weakness comes from its low redistribution 
power and the incapacity to reduce inequality. Also, lump-
sum tax would have no effect on reducing tax competition 
or correcting the behavior related to harmful good 
consumption (i.e. corrective taxation). The only advantages 
of lump-sum tax lies in its ability to decrease labor taxation 
and lower tax evasion. In conclusion, the EU lump-sum tax 
might help to contribute to closing of the sustainability gap 
in the form of tax compliance and tax fraud. On the other 
hand, lump-sum taxation could have a mild effect on 
decreasing the dependence of tax systems on labor 
taxation. 
The paper researches the potential of the lump-sum tax 
levied at the EU level, by estimating the tax revenues 
which could be raised if the tax would be imposed on every 
EU citizen. Alternatively, the lump-sum tax potential is 
assessed by excluding the economically inactive population 
aged between 0–14 years and 65+ years. 
One major factor that would make lump-sum tax 
applicable at the EU level stems out of a low and 
affordable tax rate, which would not significantly affect 
low and middle income individuals. On the other hand, the 
Inzinerine Ekonomika-Engineering Economics, 2017, 28(4), 376–385 
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lump-sum tax base is a broad one, taking into consideration 
that the population of the EU is more than 500 Mil.  
Tax revenues are estimated by imposing lump-sum tax 
at different rates, starting with lower rate of EUR 1 per 
person paid annually and the upper rate of EUR 100 paid 
annually by every EU citizen. The results of the 
simulations show that the first three proposed tax rates 
would bring a low level of revenues when compared with 
actual the EU Own resources. In comparison with low tax 
rates, the upper limit of EUR 100 per person would be 
highly unpopular and regressive, affecting the poor 
categories of the EU citizens. Moreover, the simulation 
also revealed, that in order to completely replace the actual 
contributions of the EU member states, the annual lump-
sum tax would have to amount up to EUR 283 per person.  
We conclude that the future EU lump-sum tax cannot 
fully replace the current system of the EU budget own 
resources, due to equity considerations. Therefore, the 
lump-sum tax is not an appropriate candidate to be 
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